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The pulp and paper industry is an important sector in the U.S. economy. According to the 
2002 U.S. Economic Census, the value of shipments in 2002 dollars was $154 billion for the 
paper industry.1 The industry accounted for 3.9% of the manufacturing shipments. The paper 
industry employed 491,000 workers (3.4% of the manufacturing industry) in 2002. However, the 
industry has been in decline. The 2007 U.S. Economic Census reports that the value of shipments 
in year 2007 decreased to $152 billion for the paper industry, representing 3.3% of 
manufacturing shipments.2 Similarly, employment in the pulp and paper industry fell to 417,000 
workers (3.1% of the manufacturing industry) in 2007.3 
North American pulp and paper companies continue suffering through decreasing world 
market shares, falling demands, and the effects of technological changes.4 Reflecting these 
longer term trends, there is an increasing number of pulp and paper firms filing for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection.5 Filing bankruptcy is often costly for shareholders because it increases the 
present value of bankruptcy costs and reveals the true value of a firm’s assets. Direct (litigation 
and attorney fees) and indirect (profit loss and time involved) costs for reorganization process 
and a chance the shares will become worthless induce a negative market reaction to bankruptcy 
filing. The magnitude of such reaction in the stock price indicates the expected total cost of 
bankruptcy filing to shareholders. 
Despite its importance in contributing to gross domestic product, employment, international 
trade, and producing a vast array of products that affect all aspects of daily life, there is no study 
on bankruptcy in the pulp and paper industry. This paper fills the existing knowledge gap and 
analyzes these failed firms in North America during a twenty year period, 1990-2009. We 
propose that an early warning signal for bankruptcy filing can be produced by a prediction model 
																																																													
1 In this paper, we define the NAICS (North American Industry Classification System, 2007) code range within 322 
(Paper manufacturing) as the pulp and paper industry. It consists of mills (NAICS 3221; Pulp, Paper, and 
Paperboard Mills) and paper manufacturing sectors (NAICS 3222; Converted Paper Product Manufacturing). 
2 We use GNP deflator to convert nominal value to real term in year 2002 dollars. 
3 The statistics can be downloaded from the website of US Census: http://www.census.gov/econ/census07. 
4 For example, recent evidence indicates that there is a shift in demand from North America to other parts of the 
world (McCarthy and Lei, 2010). 
5 Notable examples are: (1) Newsprint maker AbitibiBowater, with 25 pulp and paper plants and 30 wood product 
plants, filed for bankruptcy protection on April 16, 2009; (2) Smurfit-Stone, a major player in the packaging sector 
and the largest cardboard maker in North America, cited ‘frozen credit markets’ for its bankruptcy protection filing 
on January 27, 2009; (3) Chesapeake Corporation, a paperboard and packaging supplier, filed for bankruptcy in 




(such as logit model and MDA) consisting of financial ratios. Nearly bankrupt firms can use the 
relevant financial ratios as a guideline for restructuring their business to avoid bankruptcy in 
years ahead and to reduce losses for investors. 
We report two new empirical findings in this study. First, we estimate the market’s reaction 
to bankruptcy filings and provide suggestive evidence that a bankruptcy announcement provides 
additional information to market participants on firm value. Shareholders suffer substantial 
losses (37%) during the month a bankruptcy occurs. Second, we demonstrate that financial ratios 
are important in predicting bankruptcy. Failed firms are less profitable, more liquidity 
constrained and higher in debt leverage. Using a binary logit model in the spirit of Ohlson 
(1980), we predict financial distresses for pulp and paper companies one to two years ahead of 
the bankruptcy. Furthermore, in a validation analysis, our model achieves 93% accuracy rate in 
the out-of-sample forecasts for two bankruptcies and 42 non-bankruptcies in the two year period, 
2007-2008. 
This analysis contributes to the literature on firm dynamics in the pulp and paper industry by 
providing a bankruptcy prediction model based on publicly-available financial information. Li et 
al. (2004) and Sun (2006) analyze the survival of U.S. pulp and paper mills from 1970 to 2000 
using a micro-capacity dataset. The survival rates of small and new mills are usually lower than 
those of the large and mature mills. Our work differs from the previous two works in an 
important aspect. Since we focus on a sample of pulp and paper firms listed on the stock 
exchange, we are able to associate the survival rates of those firms with financial information, 
which has implications for management and is absent in the previous two studies. 
Moreover, we quantify the adverse valuation effect of a bankruptcy filing. Pesendorfer 
(2003) examines mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the U.S. paper and paperboard industry in 
the 1980s, and shows that the efficiency of most acquiring firms improved after an acquisition. 
Mei and Sun (2008) examine 70 M&As for the period 1990-2004 and show that the average 
cumulative abnormal returns for targeting firms is about 4% over a 7-15 days event window.6 
Esteve-Perez et al. (2010) argue that, although both M&A and bankruptcy are important routes 
for firm exit, these two exit routes are very different and should be examined separately. The 
former method sells the firm as a whole to another firm, whereas the latter method sells the 
assets in the market. The choice of using M&A or bankruptcy as an exit strategy depends on 
																																																													
6 Event study is also employed in Niquidet (2008) to quantify the change in forest policy of Canada.  
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various factors, including age, size, labor productivity and whether undertaking R&D and 
advertising activities. Interesting, our paper complements the previous work in showing that 
there are fewer bankruptcies than M&A for the period 1990-2004, and bankruptcy filing results 
in a negative market reaction. 
 
2 Bankruptcy: Background and Literature 
When a firm is unable to service its debt or pay its creditors, there are two common options 
to resolve the problem. First, the firm and its creditors can negotiate with its creditors to 
restructure debt payments. Private negotiation does not entail legal costs and is more cost-
effective to resolve the problem if the firm and its creditors can easily reach a solution for debt 
restructure. Second, the firm or its creditors can file with a federal bankruptcy court for 
protection under either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11. In Chapter 7, the business ceases operations, a 
trustee sells all of its assets, and then distributes the proceeds to its creditors. Any residual 
amount is returned to the owners of the firm. In Chapter 11, the debtor usually proposes a plan of 
reorganization to stay in business and continues to operate the business during restructuring. A 
bankruptcy court oversees the reorganization of the firm's contractual and debt obligations and 
may grant complete or partial relief from most of the firm's debts and contracts. In this section, 
we concentrate on Chapter 11, which is the focus of our empirical analysis. 
After filing bankruptcy, the U.S. Trustee, the bankruptcy arm of the Justice Department, will 
appoint one or more committees to represent the interests of creditors and stockholders in 
working with the firm to develop a plan of reorganization. The plan must be accepted by the 
creditors, bondholders, and stockholders, and confirmed by the court. However, even if creditors 
or stockholders vote to reject the plan, the court can disregard the vote and still confirm the plan 
if it finds that it treats creditors and stockholders fairly. Once the plan is confirmed, another more 
detailed report (Form 8-K) must be filed with the SEC containing a summary of the plan. 
Moreover, under Chapter 11, a firm usually keeps doing business and its stock and bonds may 
continue to trade in securities markets. Since it still trades, the firm must continue to file SEC 
reports with information about significant developments. 
The main benefit of filing protection under Chapter 11 is that the firm can keep its assets to 
continue its business. The firm is granted a time period to successfully reconstruct its debt. Filing 
Chapter 11 often involves changes in management, organization and governance structure in 
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order to improve resource allocation within the firm and create value. On the other hand, there 
are direct and indirect costs for filing Chapter 11. The direct costs are litigation and attorney fees, 
whereas the indirect costs include time involved and profit forgone. White (1984) shows that 
total cost for filing Chapter 11 ranges from 3% to 10% of debt value for direct costs plus 
significant indirect costs. 
Firms choose to file Chapter 11 when the benefit outweighs cost. For example, benefits will 
likely outweigh costs when: 1) coordination among a firm’s many creditors to reach a 
reorganization plan is difficult, making it more likely for firms to file protection under Chapter 
11; 2) the firm wants to halt all creditors’ collection efforts for months or years (as managers 
draft and then negotiate a plan of reorganization) in order to continue its business; and 3) the 
direct costs of filing Chapter 11 are substantial as is the case for less-capitalized firms. 
Because of the huge potential cost of bankruptcy filing, researchers conduct event studies to 
examine market reactions to bankruptcy filings. More specifically, they estimate the abnormal 
return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for filing firms based on the event study 
methodology. The AR, i.e. the excess return over expected return, around an event is attributed 
to the occurrence of the event. Researchers use the AR over the event window to measure the 
impact of a bankruptcy announcement on firm value. Additionally, they employ the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), i.e. the abnormal return summed over the event window for each point 
in time, as an overall measure of the impact over a time period. Looking into U.S. listed firms, 
Clark and Weinstein (1983) and Lang and Stulz (1992) show, respectively, that there is a 
negative market reaction in response to a bankruptcy announcement during 1960-70's and 1970-
80's.  
Based on the event study methodology, we provide suggestive evidence that there is a 
negative market reaction to a bankruptcy announcement for pulp and paper firms. Figure 1 plots 
the CAR for filing firms in the pulp and paper industry over the event window twenty days 
before and five days after the announcement.7  We report that shareholders incur 36.9% losses 
during the period one day before and after the bankruptcy announcement, which is comparable to 
that (47%) shown in Clark and Weinstein (1983). To put our results in perspective, we compute 
the valuation effects (i.e. the changes in market capitalization) on bankrupt firms. The average 
market capitalizations of filing firms in the pulp and paper industry is 0.13 million fifty days 
																																																													
7 The estimation procedure is outlined in the Appendix 2 
6 
 
before the bankruptcy. The negative valuation impact on filing firms is about 0.07 (=0.13*0.369) 
million. 
The substantial loss in shareholder wealth when a firm announces its bankruptcy filing 
draws the attention of economists to understand and predict bankruptcy choice. In a seminal 
work, Altman (1968) shows that a firm is more likely to fail if it is unprofitable, highly 
leveraged, and illiquid. Myers (1977) then provides a theoretical model which helps to explain 
these findings. The model predicts that investors will choose to liquidate a firm if its liquidation 
value exceeds its continuation value. If a profitable firm has a higher continuation value, one 
should find that it is less likely to go bankrupt than unprofitable firm. 
Bulow and Shoven (1978) examine an insolvent firm’s decision between liquidation and 
continuation, with a focus on the efficient timing of bankruptcy. This study assumes that a bank 
lender and equity holder have bankruptcy decision power but a bondholder does not have rights 
to restructure its debt. Consequently, the bankruptcy decision of a bank and equity holder is not 
based on maximizing total value of the firm, and can lead viable firms to shut down or non-
viable firms to survive. Aivazian and Callen (1983) argue that allowing re-contracting among 
shareholders and bondholders can potentially overcome any inefficiency generated by 
bankruptcy, as long as bargaining costs are negligible. They claim that formal bankruptcy code, 
such as Chapter 11, may reduce transaction costs helping to generate efficient re-contracting 
outcomes in bankruptcy. 
The theory suggests profitability determines bankruptcy decision. For example, a firm has a 
high bankruptcy probability if it faces very competitive input and output markets or it faces a 
drop in pulp prices because each leads to lower firm profits. Financial condition is also important 
to a bankruptcy decision because it informs on a firm's value and its ability to service debt. A 
firm is less likely to default on its debt if it has access to internal or external finance. A liquid 
firm has relatively easy access to internal finance, and so it is less likely to go bankrupt than an 
illiquid firm. Large firms are less likely to encounter market credit constraints for external 
finance because there is less information asymmetry for large firms. A highly-leveraged firm is 
more likely to file bankruptcy because creditors can file bankruptcy protection when the firm 
cannot service its debt. Therefore, profitability, liquidity, size and leverage relate to bankruptcy 
filing. 
Moreover, macroeconomic variables are useful in predicting a bankruptcy decision because 
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these factors affect firm's profitability and access to finance. For example, according to the U.S. 
Court, the number of Chapter 11 bankrupting filing increased from 5,163 in 2006 to 15,189 in 
2009. In the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2007, the amount of loans and the cost of loans 
decreased and increased, respectively (Ivashina and Scharfte, 2010; Santos 2010). The adverse 
macroeconomic shock reduced a firm's profitability and made it more difficult for a firm to 
obtain funding to service its debt. Consequently, it the financial crisis raised bankruptcy filings 
after 2007. 
 
3 A Model of Bankruptcy Prediction  
In light of the adverse effect of bankruptcy filings on shareholders, a bankruptcy prediction 
model provides a warning system for managers to mitigate the chance of firm failure. There are 
many prediction models proposed in the bankruptcy literatures. Models based on accounting 
ratios are commonly used to measure firms’ bankruptcy risks. The basis of this class of models is 
that financial ratios should systematically vary between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms at least 
one year before a firm files for bankruptcy protection. Beaver (1966) pioneers the use of 
financial ratios for bankruptcy prediction, but his approach was restricted to univariate analysis. 
However, there is no consensus on which set of financial ratios to include in the bankruptcy 
studies. Boritz (1991), for example, suggests more than 65 financial ratios while Hamer (1983) 
argues that the ability of a model to predict firm failure is relatively independent of ratios used. 
Altman (1968) develops an empirical framework for bankruptcy prediction using multiple 
discriminant analysis (MDA). Ohlson (1980), on the other hand, uses logit analysis, which 
overcomes several statistical problems inherent in the MDA approach, including the assumptions 
that the financial ratios of bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups are normally distributed and have 
the same variance-covariance matrix (Maddala, 1983 page 16-18). Hamer (1983) compares 
MDA with logit analysis for several datasets and concludes that both models are comparable in 
predicting firm failure. However, Begley et al. (1996) argues that Ohlson’s model outperforms 
Altman’s (1968) model. Logit analysis and MDA are two commonly used methods in the 
literature of bankruptcy prediction. In this paper, we employ the logit model based on financial 
ratios (including total assets) according to Ohlson (1980) as our main model and provide a 
robustness check with the MDA model of Altman (1968) (reported in Appendix 3). The results 
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of both models point to the conclusion that financial ratios are useful in predicting bankruptcy in 
the years ahead, which provide confidence in our use of logit analysis and financial ratios.8 
Ohlson (1980) uses a logit model to examine the probability of bankruptcy. Let yi be the 
occurrence of bankruptcy for firm i, which equals 1 if a firm files for bankruptcy and 0 
otherwise. The probability that firm i goes bankrupt is 















    (1)
 
where {1…, k} are k parameters to be estimated, {X1…, Xk} are variables that determine 
bankruptcy, and the errors are logistically distributed. Listed below, Ohlson identifies nine 
financial ratios below to represent four general factors that affect bankruptcy: firm size (1), 
financial structure (2, 4), liquidity (3, 5, 6), and performance (7, 8, 9). From the logit model, the 






)exp(  .9 
(1) ln (Total Assets/GNP Price-level Index), a measure of real assets (RASSET) and firm 
size. Since total assets are reported in dollars, we deflate it with the GNP deflator with a 
base value of 100 for year 1968; 
(2) Total Liabilities/Total Assets (TLTA), which measures overall debt leverage; 
(3) Current Liabilities/Current Assets (CLCA), which measures short-term obligation for 
current assets; 
(4) Net Liability (NLNEG), which is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm’s total 
liabilities exceed total assets and 0 otherwise;  
(5) Working Capital/Total Assets (WCTA), which measures liquidity relative to total assets 
and total debts; 
(6) (Pretax Income + (Depreciation and Amortization))/Total Liabilities (FFOTL), which 
measures firm performance on recurring operations; 10 
																																																													
8 We focus on Ohlson’s (1980) logit model rather than Atlman’s (1968) MDA model because it allows us to use 
more observations of bankrupt firms. There are two bankrupt firms in our sample, namely Equitable Bag Co. Inc. 
and American Tissue Inc., which do not have market value of equity data for estimating Atlman’s (1968) model. 
9 The odds of bankruptcy are P(yi = 1|Xi) /(1 – (P(yi = 1|Xi)) which, from equation (3) is exp(i), which implies that 
a unit increase in Xi increases the odds of bankruptcy by a factor of exp(i).  
10 Ohlson used (Funds provided by Operations/Total Liabilities). Funds provided by Operations is operating revenue 
which was not available. As a proxy, we used (Pretax Income + Depreciation and Amortization).  
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(7) Net Income/Total Assets (NITA), which profitability in the current year; 
(8) Income Negative for Two Years (INTWO), which captures firms with extremely poor 
profitability. INTWO is a dummy variable which takes the value one if net income was 
negative for the last two years and 0 otherwise;  
(9) Change in Net Income (CHIN), which measures income growth and is defined as         
(Nit - Nit-1)/(|Nit| + |Nit-1|), where Nit is net income for year t and the denominator acts to 
ensure positive income growth when (Nit – Nit-1) is positive, regardless of whether net 
income in year (t-1) is positive or negative.  
 
Ohlson’s O-score is the estimated probability of bankruptcy from the logit model,  



















Ohlson estimates his models using 105 bankrupt and 2058 non-bankrupt firms in manufacturing 
industries. Equation (2) reports Ohlson’s estimated logit (i.e. log odds) for predicting bankruptcy 
one-year ahead: 
ln[Pi/(1 – Pi)]= –1.32 –0.41 RASSET + 6.03 TLTA – 1.43 WCTA + 0.08 CLCA –     (2) 
1.72 NLNEG – 2.37 NITA – 1.83 – FUTL +0.29 INTWO  – 0.52 CHIN  
 
Ohlson finds that a cut-off value Pcutoff = 0.038 minimizes the sum of Type I (predicting a 
bankrupt firm to be healthy) and Type II (predicting a healthy firm to be bankrupt) errors for his 
sample. A higher Pcutoff indicates a higher probability of bankruptcy. If the predicted probability 
iP̂  for firm i from Ohlson’s model is less than the cutoff Pcutoff point but the firm is bankrupt, this 
is a Type I error. A Type II error occurs when the predicted probability iP̂  is greater than the cut-
off point Pcutoff, but the firm is not bankrupt.  
 
4 Data 
Our empirical analysis utilizes a sample of publicly listed firms from COMPUSTAT North 
America and the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) databases, Wharton Research 
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Data Services (WRDS). We focus on pulp and paper firms (NAICS 322) between 1990 and 2009 
which covers three sectors including pulp and paper mills, paperboard mills, and converted paper 
product manufacturing. We collect the daily stock prices of individual firms from CRSP, and use 
these to compute the daily returns for analyzing the market’s reaction to a firm’s bankruptcy 
filing. Using COMPUSTAT, we collect annual financial and related data from a firm’s balance 
sheet and income statement to compute the financial ratios for building a bankruptcy prediction 
model. 
We define the bankruptcy date according to the date of bankruptcy filing reported in 
BankruptcyData.com.11 Events included correspond to filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection 
(corporation reorganization and restructuring).12 Our sample includes 122 individual firms, 12 of 
which filed for bankruptcy during the sample period. Table A1-1 in Appendix 1 provides the list 
of bankrupt firms in the pulp and paper industry from 1990 to 2009, including their filing dates 
and 4-digit NAICS codes. There are 27 filings of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection over that 
period in which 5 and 8 bankruptcies filed in year 2000 and 2009, respectively. Although there 
are idiosyncrasies in determining the bankruptcy decision, bankruptcy filing increases during 
economic recessions. Moreover, the more recent bankruptcy filings are in pulp, paper and 
paperboard sector of the industry. 
Our sample covers about 5% of total firms in the pulp and paper industry (SIC 322) in which 
there are 3,808, 3,537 and 3,242 in years 1997, 2002 and 2007, respectively, according to U.S. 
Economic Census. Therefore, our sample of listed firms cannot capture the bankruptcy 
probability of private firms, which are smaller in size and young in age. Esteve-Perez et al. 
(2010) point out that the choice of bankruptcy filing as an exit strategy decreases as firm size 
increases. As a result, our empirical results need to be interpreted with caution because we may 
underestimate the effect of financial and macroeconomic conditions on bankruptcy probability. 
 
5 Descriptive Statistics 
Our 122 individual sample firms give us a sample of 1,047 firm-years that have data on O-
																																																													
11 We cross-check the year of bankruptcy with the year of deletion reported in LoPucki’s Bankruptcy Research 
Database (BRD) and COMPUSTAT (footnote 34). Source of BRD: http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu, provided by Lynn 
M. LoPucki. 
12 We cross checked these data with COMPUSTAT (footnote 35, reason of deletion). 
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Score over the period 1990-2005.13 For compiling the sample for the prediction model, we 
removed the firm-years after they filed Chapter 11.14 Also, in order to include only those firms 
that survived throughout a fiscal year, we use data one year before the year of bankruptcy.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our bankrupt firms and their matched non-
bankrupt counterparts. For each bankrupt firm in the pulp and paper sector (NAICS 322), we 
find two non-bankrupt firms in this same sector which have total assets that are next bigger and 
next smaller than the bankrupt firm. We then match the financial ratios of the bankrupt firm with 
the simple average of the two selected non-bankrupt firms. Since data are through 2005 and 
some pulp and paper firms went bankrupt after that year, the number of observations for one and 
two years before the bankruptcy are less than the number of observations three years prior to the 
bankruptcy. For example, Chesapeake went bankrupt in 2008. To predict bankruptcy one year 
ahead requires data for 2007, which is unavailable. But we can predict bankruptcy two years 
ahead because we have 2006 data available. On the other hand, there are several firms that only 
have data for two sample years, thus the observations on three years prior to the bankruptcy for 
those failed firms are unavailable. Consequently, the number of observations for three years 
before the bankruptcy is less than the number of observations two years prior to the bankruptcy. 
We compare the financial ratios of bankrupt and matched non-bankrupt firms for one to 
three years prior to the bankruptcy. The financial ratios are classified into four groups reflecting 
size, liquidity, profit and leverage. Tables A1-2 in Appendix 1 reports the data sources and 
defines the variables in the logit models.  
From the t-statistics, there is no significant difference in the level of real total assets size, i.e. 
firm size, between the bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. The failed firms are more liquidity 
constrained relative to the non-failed firms. And the failed firms have fewer current assets to 
meet their short term obligation of current liability. Figure 2 indicates that the ratio of current 
liabilities to current assets (CLCA) increases from 67% to 242% when the failed firms approach 
bankruptcy. On the other hand, for non-failed firms, this ratio hovers around 46-60%. 
Additionally, the failed firms have lower ratios of net working capital to total assets (WCTA) 
and ratios of funds provided by operations to total liabilities (FFOTL), which are about zero. 
																																																													
13 Although the price information is available until 2009, the balance sheet information for estimating the prediction 
model ended in 2006. Therefore, the last year of the model uses the information in 2005 to predict the bankruptcy in 
2006 
14 We also deleted a non-bankrupt firm, EarthShell Corp., which we regard as an outlier due to its small total assets. 
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Not surprisingly, non-failed firms are more profitable and the pattern of net income to total 
assets (NITA) indicates that the failed firms consistently lose money several years before 
bankruptcy. Figure 3 shows that, as a ratio of total assets, net income declines from -3% to less 
than -15% as the year of bankruptcy approaches, while the non-bankrupt firms maintain net 
income at 1-4% of their total assets. Consistent with these results are INTWO and CHIN. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Means Tests for Bankrupt (B) and Non-Bankrupt (NB) Firms 
Variable B NB t-stat B NB t-stat B NB t-stat
Size Related
RASSET 0.15 0.17 -0.10 0.26 0.24 0.10 0.55 0.47 0.16
[0.48] [0.55] [0.54] [0.54] [0.98] [1.06]
Liquidity Related
WCTA -0.34 0.20 -3.42 0.09 0.15 -2.23 0.12 0.19 -1.19
[0.47] [0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.09] [0.15]
CLCA 2.42 0.46 3.14 0.71 0.60 1.84 0.67 0.53 1.27
[1.87] [0.06] [0.15] [0.11] [0.26] [0.19]
FFOTL -0.07 0.18 -2.33 0.02 0.20 -2.90 0.07 0.19 -1.33
[0.17] [0.27] [0.18] [0.10] [0.19] [0.19]
Profit Related
NITA -0.15 0.01 -2.30 -0.06 0.04 -3.60 -0.03 0.02 -1.39
[0.20] [0.10] [0.08] [0.04] [0.10] [0.03]
INTWO 0.33 0.06 1.58 0.20 0.05 1.05 0.44 0.00 2.53
[0.50] [0.17] [0.42] [0.16] [0.53] [0.00]
CHIN -0.12 0.10 -0.85 -0.32 0.10 -1.28 -0.08 -0.21 0.42
[0.59] [0.51] [0.85] [0.18] [0.84] [0.39]
Leverage Related
TLTA 1.01 0.67 3.52 0.84 0.67 2.44 0.74 0.62 1.14
[0.21] [0.20] [0.19] [0.10] [0.19] [0.24]
NLNEG 0.44 0.11 1.76 0.10 0.05 0.45 0.11 0.06 0.45
[0.53] [0.22] [0.32] [0.16] [0.33] [0.17]
RASSET - Log(Real Total Assets)
WCTA - Net Working Capital/Total Assets#
CLCA - Current Liabilities/Current Assets
FFOTL - (Pretax Income + Depreciation and Amortization)/Total Liabilities
NITA - Net Income/Total Assets
INTWO - Negative Income, Two Years Dummy Variable
CHIN - Change in Net Income
TLTA - Total Liabilities/Total Assets
NLNEG - Net Liability Dummy Variable
Standard Deviations are shown in []
(obs = 9) (0bs = 10) (0bs = 9)
1
st




 year Before 
 
 
Turning to a firm’s capital structure, we see that the failed firms have ratios of total 
liability to total assets (TLTA) one and two years before bankruptcy that are significantly higher 
than those of the non-failed firms. For the failed firms, TLTA increases from 74% to 101% as 
bankruptcy approaches, which is much higher than the TLTAs of the non-bankrupt firms. Figure 
4 illustrates that TLTAs of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms diverge as early as three years 
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before bankruptcy, which is consistent with the previous results. Moreover, total liability of a 
failed firm is likely to be larger than its total asset in the year before bankruptcy (NLNEG). This 
suggests that those firms that rely on debt finance have a high risk of failure when profitability 
and liquidity decline during economic downturns. In particular, the failed firms have difficulty 
meeting their debt obligations for both short and long term debts. 
 
Table 2 Correlation Matrix for Variable used in Ohlson (1980) 
RASSET TLTA WCTA CLCA NITA FFOTL INTWO NLNEG CHIN
RASSET 1 
TLTA 0.20 1 
WCTA -0.34 -0.51 1 
CLCA 0.05 0.31 -0.71 1 
NITA 0.08 -0.33 0.28 -0.30 1 
FFOTL -0.18 -0.38 0.38 -0.22 0.53 1 
INTWO -0.06 0.31 -0.14 0.18 -0.30 -0.15 1 
NLNEG -0.04 0.63 -0.19 0.22 -0.23 -0.10 0.26 1 
CHIN -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.05 0.31 0.13 0.22 0.01 1 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients for variables in our sample used in Ohlson’s 
models.15 The financial state variables TLTA, NLNEG, WCTA and CLCA are uncorrelated with 
the performance variables NITA, FFOTL, INTWO and CHIN. However, there are high 
correlations between WCTA and TLTA, between WCTA and CLCA, between NLNEG and 
TLTA and between FFOTL and NITA. This suggests that (1) NLNEG and CLCA may not be 
statistically significant in the logit regression model and (2) NITA provides little independent 
information in the statistical analysis conditional on FFOTL. These results support the 
hypothesis that liquidity, profitability and leverage are important in analyzing the bankruptcy 
occurrences. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics by Sectors  
 
We categorize our sample into two sectors, pulp and paper mills and converted paper. Table 
																																																													
15 Ohlson (1980) only reported correlation coefficients larger than 0.20. 
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3 reports the descriptive statistics of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms in these sectors one year 
before bankruptcy.16 Firms in the mill sector are larger than those in the converted paper sector.17 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Means Tests: Bankrupt (B) and Non-Bankrupt (NB) Firms  
Across Sectors and in the 1st year Before Bankruptcy 
 
B NB t-stat B NB t-stat
Size Related
RASSETS 0.24 0.34 -0.60 0.07 0.04 0.08
[0.20] [0.29] [0.64] [0.72]
Liquidity
WCTA -0.14 0.19 -1.16 -0.49 0.20 -4.47
[0.58] [0.03] [0.34] [0.06]
CLCA 1.81 0.44 1.13 2.91 0.47 3.87
[2.41] [0.07] [1.41] [0.06]
FFOTL 0.01 0.02 -0.07 -0.13 0.31 -3.73
[0.17] [0.28] [0.16] [0.21]
Profitability
NITA -0.09 -0.04 -0.51 -0.21 0.05 -2.67
[0.18] [0.14] [0.21] [0.02]
INTWO 0.50 0.13 1.19 0.20 0.00 1.00
[0.58] [0.25] [0.45] [0.00]
CHIN 0.26 -0.18 1.07 -0.42 0.32 -2.94
[ 0.57] [0.59] [0.44] [0.36]
Leverage
TLTA 1.05 0.75 1.79 0.98 0.60 3.13
[0.31] [0.11] [0.11] [0.25]
NLNEG 0.50 0.13 1.19 0.40 0.10 1.13
[0.58] [ 0.25] [0.55] [0.22]
Std. deviations are shown in []




Profitability is lower for a bankrupt firm than its non-bankrupt counterpart. Moreover, the 
bankrupt firms in the converted paper sector are less profitable than those in the mills sector. In 
addition, bankrupt firms in the mills sector are more leveraged than those in the converted paper 
sector (see TLTA). And liquidity of a bankrupt firm is lower than that of its non-bankrupt 
counterpart, particularly in the converted paper sector (see WCTA, CLCA and FFOTL). These 
results are again consistent with expectations that poor profitability, high leverage, and tight 
liquidity are important features of bankrupt firms across the two sectors. 
																																																													
16 The results in years 2 and 3 are qualitatively similar to those in year 1. Descriptive statistics for two and three 
years before bankruptcy are available upon request. 
17 In terms of total assets (1 year before bankruptcy), the firm size of bankrupt mills is 1,669 million and that of non-
bankrupt mills is 1755. On the other hand, the firm size of bankrupt converted paper firms is 438 million and that of 
non-bankrupt converted paper firms is 445. 
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6 Empirical Results 
In this section, we re-estimate the Ohlson (1980) model on our sample of 1,047 firm-year 
observations and discuss their results.18 And we extend Ohlson’s model to include real GDP 
growth (RGDPG) and real interest rate of 2-year Treasury bond (Rinterest) to control for 
aggregate fluctuations. To capture sectoral heterogeneity, we include a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the firm has a pulping mill and 0 otherwise. Table 4 reports the estimates of Ohlson’s 
original model and our re-estimated model.  
 
Table 4 Logit Estimates and their Marginal Effects 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Marginal Effect
RASSET -0.41* 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.00
WCTA -1.43** 0.76 -4.35* 1.48 -0.05
CLCA 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.00
FFOTL -1.83* 0.78 -1.82* 0.91 -0.02
NITA -2.37** 1.28 1.82 1.90 0.02
INTWO 0.29 0.36 0.39 0.82 0.00
CHIN -0.52* 0.24 -1.13** 0.63 -0.01
TLTA 6.03* 0.91 2.13** 1.25 0.02
NLNEG -1.72* 0.7 -0.05 1.29 0.00
RGDPG 50.67* 23.53 0.54
Rinterest -20.27 26.64 -0.22
Mills -0.86 1.00 -0.01
Constant -1.32 1.36 -5.88* 1.15
# Observations 2163 1047
Log-Likelihood 0.839 0.306
Std. errors are clustered by firm. * and ** denote significance levels at 5% and 10%, respectively
Note: We compute marginal effects by taking the simple average of marginal effects at every observation.
For the discrete explanatory variables, we compute the change in bankruptcy
probability when the corresponding indicator switches from the value zero to one.
Original Model Re-estimated Model
 
 
Our model predicts bankruptcy in the following one or two years. The empirical results of 
the re-estimated model indicate that firms with higher WCTA, FFOTL and CHIN and lower 
TLTA are less vulnerable to bankruptcy. Table 4 also reports the average of sample enumerated 
marginal effects (i.e. partial derivative) of the probability of bankruptcy with respect to each 
explanatory variable. When there is a 1% increase in WCTA, FFOTL and CHIN, the probability 
of bankruptcy decreases by 5%, 2% and 1%, respectively. On the other hand, a 1% increase in 
																																																													
18 STATA was used to for all estimation results reported. Our model corresponds to Ohlson’s Model III. 
16 
 
TLTA raises the probability of bankruptcy by 2%. 
Contrasting our estimates with Ohlson (1980) highlights several differences. Knowing that 
the firm has enough liquidity (WCTA and FFOTL), high profit growth (CHIN) and low leverage 
(TLTA) is useful for predicting bankruptcy in our sample and is consistent with Ohlson’s 
original model. Moreover, NLNEG is significant in predicting bankruptcy in Ohlson (1980) for 
manufacturing firms; in our results NLNEG also has the expected sign for predicting bankruptcy. 
However, the result on net profit per unit assets (NITA) is less consistent with those in Ohlson 
(1980).The logit regression results also provide guidelines for remediating ahead of time 
potential financial distress, guidelines which confirm common notions about bankruptcy. Capital 
structure, debt leverage and profitability are important in detecting bankruptcy. Keeping total 
liabilities low relative to total assets, maintaining positive profit growth, higher working capital 
relative to total asset, and increasing income from recurring operations all work to firm lower 
bankruptcy risks. 19 
 
7 Predicting Bankruptcy 
To assess the classification accuracy of the logit model, we perform in-sample and out-of-
sample predictions for recent bankruptcy events to further assess our models. For each type of 
prediction, we compute the O-scores (i.e. predicted probabilities) for the original and re-
estimated models. For the in-sample predictions, we report the cutoff point for the re-estimated 
Ohlson models that minimize misclassification and combined errors, respectively.20 We then 
analyze the predictions for the groups of bankrupt and non-bankruptcy firms. 
Following Ohlson (1980), we use the sum of Type I and Type II error rates (the combined 
error) to deduce the optimal probability cutoff for the logit model.21 For one-year-ahead 
																																																													
19 We also experiment with the specifications with interaction terms between financial ratios and macro variables. 
However, they do not improve the model and are dropped from the final estimation results. 
20 The distinction between in-sample and out-of-sample refers to whether the prediction sample for the re-estimated 
model is the estimation sample or a validation sample. All predictions based upon Ohlson’s original models are out-
of-sample. Thus, using the estimation sample, Tables 5 – 6 compare Ohlson’s out-of-sample predictions with our in-
sample predictions. And Table 7 compares Ohlson’s out-of-sample prediction with our out-of-sample predictions.  
21 Ohlson’s approach is the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) goodness of fit method. Let  be the Type I 
error and  be the Type II error. The ROC curve plots the true positive (predict distressed firm to be bankrupt, which 
equals (1 – ) and is referred to as the ‘sensitivity of a classification’) against false positive (predict healthy firm to 
be bankrupt, which equals 1 – true negative and is referred to as the ‘specificity of a classification’). A 45o line 
represents randomness where the sum of  and  equals 1. The difference between a ROC curve and a 45o line for a 
specified Type II error is (1- Type I error). Therefore, the cutoff t for minimizing the combined error is equivalent to 
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predictions, the optimal cutoff proposed in Ohlson (1980) is 0.038, whereas the optimal cutoff 
from our re-estimated model is 0.14. Our cutoff value is higher than Ohlson’s original model 
because there is a smaller proportion of bankrupt firms in our sample.22 
For the re-estimated model, Table 5 reports Type I and Type II errors of 44% and 1%, 
respectively. The misclassification rate is 4%. Although Ohlson’s original model achieves a 
lower Type I error for the in-sample predictions, the re-estimated model out-performs Ohlson’s 
original model in terms of both Type II and misclassification errors. 
 
 Table 5 Classification Errors of Ohlson Model for the In-Sample Predictions 







Type I 11 0.00 0.44 
Type II 111 0.99 0.01 
Misclassification Error 122 0.98 0.04 
Authors’ calculations; Ohlson’s O-Score is 0.038; Our O-Score cutoff is 0.14 
 
We use the coefficients reported in Ohlson (1980) to compute the O-score for our sample. Using 
this measure, Table 6 indicates that the average O-score of bankrupt firms is larger than that of 
the non-bankrupt firms, ranging from 0.90 to 0.98 and which significantly exceeds the cutoff 
point (0.038) proposed in Ohlson (1980). However, the O-score for non-bankrupt firms is 0.73 
which is also greater than the 0.038 cutoff point of bankruptcy, indicating that there are Type II 
errors in this model. 
Table 6 In-Sample O-Score for Bankrupt (B) and Non-Bankrupt (NB) Firms 
1st year Before 
Bankruptcy (N=9) 
2nd year Before 
Bankruptcy (N=7) 




Original 0.98 0.90 0.90 0.73 
Re-estimated 0.32 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Authors’ calculations; the cutoff of the original model is 0.038; the cutoff of our model is 0.14. The re-estimated  
																																																																																																																																																																																																				
finding the a (t), (t)β̂ , that maximizes the distance between ROC curve and 45o line, that is, it maximizes (1 – (t) – 
(t)β̂ ) or minimizes the Type I error 
22 The set of non-bankrupt firms included all available firms (except utilities) in COMPUSTAT over the period 1970 
– 1976, which numbered 2,058 firms, Adding the 105 bankrupt firms over the period gives Ohlson a total sample of 
2,163 observations. Bankrupt firms comprised approximately 5% of the sample. In our sample, we combine all non-
bankrupt firms in the pulp and paper sector (NAICS 322) during 1980 – 2005 with bankrupt firms in this sector 
during the same period for a total sample of 1,706. Only 13 (0.008%) of these firms were bankrupt. 
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model correctly predicts bankruptcy one year before the occurrence because the average O-score 
of bankrupt firms exceeds the cutoff (0.14). Moreover, the O-score increases as bankruptcy 
nears, which suggests that the probability of bankruptcy increases. On average, there is no 
misclassification error in this model because the O-scores of non-failed firms remain below 0.01 
which are lower than the cutoff point. 
 
7.1 Out-of-Sample Predictions  
 
Another assessment of our model is out-of-sample predictions. We use our model, estimated 
on sample data for the 1990-2005, to predict two bankruptcies and 42 non-bankruptcies that 
occurred between 2007 and 2008. We compute the O-scores for each of these firms in 2006 
using the original and re-estimated models. We then use these scores to predict bankruptcy or 
non-bankruptcy for the two year period 2007-2008. Table 7 reports the Type I, Type II and total 
misclassification errors for the two models. 
 
Table 7 Prediction Errors for the Out-of-Sample Forecast in Year 2006 





Type I  
(bankrupt firm is predicted to be healthy) 
 2 0.00 1.00 
Type II 
 (healthy firm is predicted to be bankrupt) 42 1.00 0.02 
Misclassification Error 44 0.91 0.07 
Authors’ calculations; the cutoff of the original O-Score model is 0.038; the cutoff of our  
O-Score model is 0.14. 
 
The original Ohlson (1980) model correctly predicts the two bankruptcies, i.e. Type I error 
is zero. However, the cutoff point for the original model is too low which gives the Type II error 
at unity. The re-estimated model predicts 0% of the bankruptcies in advance. Encouragingly, the 
Type II error for re-estimated model decreases to 2%. The misclassification errors for original 
and re-estimated models of Ohlson (1980) are 91% and 7%, respectively. As a result, based on 
the misclassifications, we infer that the re-estimated model of Ohlson (1980) provides a better 
performance for the out-of-sample forecast than the original model. The re-estimated model out-





Our study provides a method for detecting potential bankruptcy in the future and a guideline 
for remedying those financial distressed firms ahead of time. In this paper, we examine the 
financial characteristics of failed firms in the North America pulp and paper industry during year 
1990-2009. We demonstrate that shareholders suffer substantial losses (37%) during the month a 
bankruptcy occurs. Encouragingly, we show that failed firms are less profitable, more liquidity 
constrained and higher in debt leverage. Using the bankruptcy prediction models proposed by 
Ohlson (1980), we report that the failed firms have higher O scores than the non-failed firms for 
one to two years before the bankruptcy. Therefore, those models are ready to predict bankruptcy 
for firms in the pulp and paper industry. We also improve those models by re-estimating them 
with a sample of firms in the pulp and paper industry. In particular, on average, the 
misclassification errors for the in-sample predictions are lower because of the low Type II error. 
Furthermore, we perform out-of-sample forecasts for two bankruptcies and 42 non-bankruptcies 
occurred between year 2007 and 2008. Based on the criterion of misclassification rate, the results 
suggest that the re-estimated models of Ohlson (1980) perform better than Ohlson’s original 
models for our sample. Since our empirical results are based on a sample of listed firms, future 
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Fig 1 CAR(-20,+5) for Filing Firms in the Industry 322 
 
       Note: Event window is (-20,+5), i.e. 20 days before and 5 days after the bankruptcy  
       announcement. Day 0 is the announcement day. Sources: CRSP and author calculation. 
 
Fig 2 CLCA for Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Firms 
 























Fig 3 NITA for Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Firms 
 
    Sources: COMPUSTAT and author calculation. 
 
Fig 4 TLTA for Bankrupt and Non-Bankrupt Firms 
 



























Appendix 1 Tables 
 
Table A1-1: List of Bankrupt Pulp & Paper Firms 1990-2009 
Filing 
Year  
Filing Date Company Name Sample Sector 
1992 September 11  Gaylord Container Corp. *$ 3222 
1994 October 14  Equitable Bag Co., Inc. * 3222 
1998 January 6  Paragon Trade Brands, Inc. #$ 3222 
2000 January 14  American Pad & Paper Company # 3222 
2000 March 15  Crown Vantage Inc. # 3221 
2000 October 10  Drypers Corp. # 3222 
2001 September 10  American Tissue, Inc. * 3221 
2004 March 30  Fibermark Inc. # 3221 
2007 November 19  Pope & Talbot, Inc. # 3221 
2008 December 29  Chesapeake Corporation # 3221 
2009 January 26  Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation #$ 3221 
2009 June 1  Caraustar Industries, Inc. #$ 3221 
Note: # Data available in COMPUSTAT; * Data available in COMPUSTAT for only two years - Those firms do not 
have O-Scores 3 years before the bankruptcy; $ Data available in CRSP for estimating CAR over the period twenty 
days before and five days after the announcement. Source: Bankruptcy.com & sector codes obtained from 
COMPUSTAT. 
 
List of Bankrupt Pulp & Paper Firms 1990-2009 
Reported in BankruptcyData.com, but there is no data in COMPUSTAT & CRSP 
Filing 
Year  
Filing Date Company Name Sector 
1991 May 24  Consolidated Packaging Corp. 3222 
2000 September 22  Eastern Pulp and Paper Corp. 3221 
2000 January 5  Imperial Home Decor Group Inc. 3222 
2001 June 11  Langston Corporation 3332 
2001 December 2  Enron (energy, pulp & paper) 2111/2212
2003 January 9  Great Northern Paper  3222 
2006 January 3  Pliant Corporation 3261 
2007 January 29  Port Townsend Paper Corp. 3221 
2008 September 4  Tembec Industries, Inc. 3221 
2009 February 11  Pliant Corporation 3261 
2009 February 13  Marathon Pulp Inc.(Parent firm: Howe Sound Pulp and Paper) 3211/3221
2009 April 16  Abitibibowater Inc. 3221 
2009 June 18  Fraser Papers 3221 
2009 June 25  Grant Forest Products Inc. 3212 





Table A1-2: Financial ratios used in the prediction model of Ohlson (1980) 
Variables Abbreviations Definitions in COMPUSTAT 
Total Assets / GDP Deflator RASSET ln(data6/gnpdfl*) 
Total liabilities / Total Assets TLTA data181/ data6 
Working Capital / Total Assets WCTA data179/ data6 
Current Liability / Current Assets CLCA data5/ data4 
Total liabilities > Total Assets NLNEG 1 if  data181> data6; 0 if else 
Net Income / Total Assets NITA data172/ data6 
Lag one and two years of Net Income < 0 INTWO 1 if  (data172[_n-1]<0) & (data172[_n-2]<0); 
0 if else 
Funds provided by operations/Total liabilities FFOTL (data170 + data14)/ data181 
Net income increase rate CHIN (data172 -  data172[_n-1]) / 







Appendix 2 An Event Study Model for Bankruptcy Announcement 
The basis of event study is the efficient market hypothesis which states that stock prices 
fully reflect all publicly available information and expectations about the future.  The abnormal 
return, i.e. the excess return over expected return, around an event is attributed to the occurrence 
of an event. Therefore, we use the abnormal return (AR) over the event window to measure the 
impact of a bankruptcy announcement on firm value. Additionally, we employ the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), i.e. the abnormal return summed over the event window for each point 
in time, as an overall measure of the impact over a time period. MacKinlay (1997) provides an 
excellent review of this methodology. 
There are several important timings for conducting an event study. The announcement of 
bankruptcy occurs at time 0, t0.  The estimation period for the return model is between t-250 and t-
50, that is, between 250 and 50 days before the announcement. To isolate the effect of a 
bankruptcy announcement on the expected return, the estimation period precedes the event 
window. The event window for analyzing the abnormal return is between t-20 and t5, between 20 
days before and 5 days after the announcement. We also look at the sub-periods within this 
window. 
Calculating the impact of a bankruptcy announcement on firm value requires knowledge 
of the firm’s expected stock price had there been no announcement. For each firm i, we use the 
market model (or Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM) to estimate the return over the estimation 
period as follows 
Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit        (A2-1) 
where αi and βi are the parameters to be estimated. Rit and Rmt is firm i’s return and the market 
return at time t, respectively. The CRSP value-weighted index (excluding dividend) is the proxy 
for the market portfolio when estimating the parameters of market model. We assume E[εit] = 0 
and Var[εit] = σiε
2 which implies that the expected return of firm i at time t is E[Rit| Rmt] = αi + 
βiRmt. Given the market model, the abnormal return ARit over the event window is 
ARit = Rit - E[Rit| Rmt] ~ N(0,σiε
2) 
For a given K period, the cumulative abnormal return CARi(t,t+K) is defined as 
CARi(t,t+K) = ∑k=0,..,KARit+k  
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Assuming that there is no correlation between ARit’s over time, then it follows that CARi(t,t+K) 
~ N(0, σ2(CARi(t,t+K))) where σ
2(CARi(t,t+K))=(K+1)σiε
2. We adopt the null hypothesis that 
CARi(t,t+K) = 0 to test the significance of the bankruptcy announcement on stock return. Since 
there are multiple bankruptcy announcements in our sample, we improve the power of our tests 
on AR and CARi(t,t+K) by aggregating ARit and CARi(t,t+K) across firms (n=1,..,N): 



























































We have 12 bankrupt firms in our sample for the prediction model, which are about 10% 
of our sample firms. The low bankruptcy rate in the pulp and paper industry, which is capital-
intensive, associates with a risk of losing a large fixed asset. The sample for the event study is 
further limited by trading suspension before filing bankruptcy. Only 4 out of 12 bankrupt firms 
(2 in mills sector and 2 in paper manufacturing sector) provided enough data for estimating AR 
and CAR around the bankruptcy announcement. The equities of 8 firms did not trade in the over-
the-counter (OTC) market after their delisting from the stock exchange. As a result, we end up 
with a sample of 4 firms for the event study. Therefore, our results from the event study are 
primarily suggestive. 
Table A2-1 reports the descriptive statistics on the bankrupt firms included in our event 
study. The market capitalizations of those firms usually decrease over the period between 250  
 
Table A2-1: Descriptive Statistics for each Bankrupt Firm 
Filing Year  Company Name NAICS α β MCap1 MCap2 Return1 Return2
1992 Gaylord Container Corp. 3222 0.002 0.589 0.027 0.038 0.003 0.010 




3221 0.003 1.387* 2.457 0.254 -0.008 -0.033 
2009 Caraustar Industries, Inc. 3221 0.003 1.042* 0.070 0.003 0.000 -0.026 
Note: The parameters α and β correspond to those in Equation (A2-1). MCap1 = Market capitalization computed at 
t=-250, and MCap2 = Market capitalization computed at t=-50. Return1 is the average daily return for the estimation 
period = (-250,-50) and Return2 is the average daily return for the event window = (-20,5). Unit: Million for market 
capitalization and %/100 for daily return. The asterisks * and ** indicate the significant level at 5% and 10% levels, 




and 50 days before the announcement. The average daily returns around the bankruptcy 
announcement are often more negative than those over the period between 250 and 50 days 
before the announcement. 
Table A2-2 reports the estimates of AR for the date of bankruptcy announcement and the 
surrounding days. For the mills sector, shareholders suffer 42.8% losses in wealth on the 
announcement day. Moreover, there is a 20.1% loss in shareholders’ wealth 1 day after the 
announcement. Similarly, for the paper manufacturing sector, there are 20.1% and 24.4% losses 
in shareholders’ wealth 3 days before and 1 day after the announcement, respectively. There is 
an interesting reversal of stock return 2 days after the announcement for the mills sector and 2-5 
days after the announcement for the paper manufacturing sector. This suggests that there are 
market overreactions to the bankruptcy announcement which induce investors to hold those 
surviving firms in hopes of benefitting from the reorganization. 
 
Table A2-2: Abnormal Return (AR) for Days (-5,5) 
Day relative to Filing-322 Filing-3221 Filing-3222 
bankruptcy  Average AR (N=4)  Average AR (N=2)  Average AR (N=2)   
-5  
-0.000 -0.015 0.014 
-4  
-0.060 -0.116 -0.003 
-3  
-0.118 -0.035 -0.201** 
-2  
-0.017 -0.033 -0.001 
-1  
0.074 0.191** -0.044 
0  
-0.220* -0.428* -0.012 
1  
-0.223* -0.201** -0.244* 
2  
0.210* 0.367* 0.054 
3  
0.013 -0.093 0.118 
4  
0.020 -0.055 0.094 
5  
-0.014 -0.107 0.079 
Note: Authors’ calculations; Standard error for filing firm-322, filing firm-3221 and filing firm-3222 are 0.075, 
0.110 and 0.103, respectively. The asterisks * and ** indicate the significant level at 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. Source: CRSP 
 
As shown in Table A2-3, the CAR for the filing firm during the month of bankruptcy is 
negative. The cumulative losses are 52.4% and 14.7% for the mills and paper manufacturing  
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Table A2-3: Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for Filing Firm 
 Filing-322 (N=4) Filing-3221 (N=2) Filing-3222 (N=2) 
Window  Average CAR SD Average CAR SD Average CAR SD 
-20, +5 -0.413 0.385 -0.752 0.562 -0.074 0.526 
-20, -6 -0.078 0.292 -0.228 0.427 0.073 0.399 
-5,+5 -0.335 0.250 -0.524 0.365 -0.147 0.342 
-2,+2 -0.178 0.169 -0.103 0.246 -0.248 0.231 
-1,+1 -0.369* 0.131 -0.438* 0.191 -0.301** 0.179 
0 -0.220* 0.075 -0.428* 0.110 -0.012 0.103 
Note: Authors’ calculations; The asterisks * and ** indicate the significant level at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: CRSP 
 
sectors during the period five days before and after the announcement, respectively. Similarly, 
the cumulative losses are 43.8% and 30.1% for the mills and paper manufacturing sectors during 
the periods one day before and after the announcement, respectively. 
To put our results in perspective, we compare the valuation effects (i.e. the changes in 
market capitalization) on bankrupt firms across two sectors. The average market capitalizations 
of filing firms in the mills and paper manufacturing sectors are both 0.13 million fifty days 
before the bankruptcy. The negative valuation impacts on filing firms are 0.07 (=0.13*0.524) 
millions for the mills sector and 0.02 (=0.13*0.147) millions for the paper manufacturing sector. 
The valuation effect on a bankrupt firm in mills sector is three times as large as that in paper 
manufacturing sector. We suggest the stronger reaction in the mills sector relates to the timing of 
bankruptcy. Firms in paper manufacturing sector filed bankruptcy in 1990s, but firms in mills 
sector filed bankruptcy after 2008 (see Table 13). The tight credit condition in the financial crisis 
imposes a larger financial cost on the shareholders because investors are less optimistic on the 





Appendix 3 Alternative Model of Bankruptcy Prediction 
We perform a robustness check of using financial information to predict bankruptcy with 
an alternative model. Altman (1968) employs multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to 
distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms based on a set of predetermined financial 
variables. MDA is a statistical technique which allows the researcher to study the difference 
between two or more groups of objects with respect to several variables simultaneously. MDA 
employs sample data to construct a model which is used to classify the observations into one of 
several groups. In the case of two groups consisting of bankrupt firms and non-bankrupt firms, 
MDA transforms a set of classification variables (financial ratios in this analysis) into a single 
discriminant Z-score which the analyst uses to classify the firms. The multivariate discriminant 
model is  
Zi = 1X1i + 2X2i + … + nXni   i = 1, …. , n   (A3-1) 
where {1, 2,…, n}  are a set of n discriminant function coefficients, {X1i, X2i,…, Xni} are 
classifying variables, i.e. financial ratios for our study, for firm i, and Zi is the discriminant score 
for firm i. If Zb be the mean value of the Z scores in the bankrupt group and Znb is the mean of 
the Z scores in the non-bankrupt group, then the cutoff is the value that maximizes the between 
group variance relative to the within group variance. The analysis classifies firm i into one of the 
two groups depending upon whether the firm’s estimated Z-score, iẐ , is greater or less than the 
estimated cut-off point, cutoffD̂ .  
In his paper, Altman (1968) identifies 22 accounting and non-accounting variables, in 
various combinations, as predictors of failure. However, he recommended a combination of five 
financial ratios for predicting bankruptcy. The set of variables includes:  
(1) Net Working Capital/Total Assets (WCTA), which measures net liquidity relative to the 
total assets;  
(2) Retained Earnings/Total Assets (RETA), which measures cumulative profitability over 
the life of the firm;  
(3) Earnings before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets (EBITTA), which measures profitability 
independent of any tax or leverage factors;  
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(4) Market Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities (MVTL), which measures a 
firm’s solvency; and  
(5) Sales/Total Assets (SALETA), which measures the sales generating ability of a firm’s 
assets.  
These five variables can be categorized into three broad groups: Financial Structure (4), 
Liquidity (1) and Performance (2, 3 and 5). The data sources of those variables are reported in 
the Table A3-1. 
Table A3-1: Financial ratios used in the prediction model of Altman (1968) 
Variables Abbreviations Definitions in COMPUSTAT 
Working Capital / Total Assets WCTA data179/ data6 
Retained Earnings / Total Assets RETA data36/data6 
Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) / Total Asset EBITTA data178/data6 
Market Value Equity / Total liabilities MVTL (data24*data25)/data181 
Sales / Total Assets SALETA data12/data6 
Source: COMPUSTAT 
 
Altman (1968) estimates his models using 33 bankrupt and 33 paired non-bankrupt firms 
in manufacturing industries during 1946-1965. His results demonstrate that, with the exception 
of (Sales/Total Assets), these financial ratios differ across bankrupt and non-bankrupt groups. 
More specifically, the mean values of the ratios are significantly smaller for Altman's bankrupt 
group than for his non-bankrupt group. Equation (A2) gives Altman’s estimated MDA model for 
predicting bankruptcy: 
        Zi = 1.2*WCTA + 1.4*RETA +  3.3*EBITTA + 0.6*MVTL + 1.0*SALETA     (A3-2) 
Altman (1968) proposes a classification method based on the cutoff Z-score ( cutoffD̂ = 2.675) that 
minimizes the combined errors, i.e. the sum of Type 1 (predicting no bankruptcy for a firm that 
declares bankruptcy) and Type 2 errors (predicting bankruptcy for a firm that is solvent).  Firms 
with Z-scores < (>) 2.675 were classified as bankrupt (non-bankrupt). Moreover, Altman (1968) 
finds that all firms in his sample with the Z-scores greater than 2.99 clearly fall into the non-
bankrupt group, while all those with the Z scores less than 1.81 declare bankruptcy within the 
following year. When the Z-score is larger than 2.99 (non-bankruptcy range), we infer that there 
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is no risk of bankruptcy. On the other hand, when the Z-score falls below 1.81 (bankruptcy 
range), we infer that there is a high risk of bankruptcy. If the Z-score falls in the closed range 
[1.81, 2.99] we do not have enough information to predict bankruptcy. 
Table A3-2 reports the correlation coefficients for variables in our sample used in with 
Altman’s (1968) model.23 The coefficients of the financial state variables (WCTA and MVTA) 
are uncorrelated with those of the performance variables (RETA, EBITTA, SALETA). Also, 
there is a high correlation between RETA and EBITTA and between RETA and SALETA. 
 
Table A3-2: Correlation Matrix for Variable used in Altman (1968) 
WCTA RETA EBITTA MVTL SALETA 
WCTA 1 
RETA 0.34 1 
EBITTA 0.22 0.54 1 
MVTL 0.42 0.01 0.03 1 
SALETA 0.03 -0.50 -0.05 -0.00 1 
 
A3.1 Estimating Altman’s Model with our sample 
 
As in our empirical analysis on Ohlson’s (1980) model, we re-estimate Altman’s (1968) 
model on our sample of firms and discuss their results.24 For our sample of pulp and paper firms, 
data of bankruptcy firms are obtained one year before the firm’s filing. For each of these 9 
bankrupt firms, a non-bankrupt firm is paired when it has the next smaller total asset.25 Re-
estimating this model gives  
Z-ScorePulp & Paper Data = 2.0*WCTA-1.3*RETA-6.2*EBITTA+1.8*MVTL+1.9*SALETA+1.0 
Similar to Begley et al. (1996) and Hillegeist et al. (2004), Altman’s (1968) original model does 
not carry over to our sample. Increasing earnings before tax and amortization (EBITTA) has 
stronger effects on reducing bankruptcy in our sample than those suggested by the Altman’s 
original model. On the other hand, the effects from increasing retained earnings (RETA) or 
																																																													
23 Altman (1968) does not report correlation coefficients in his study. 
24 STATA was used to for all estimation results reported.  
25 For example, if one firm goes bankrupt in 1991, then we use 1990 for that firm. Alternatively, if another firm goes 
bankrupt in 2000, then we use 1999 data for this firm.  
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increasing solvency (MVTA) are weaker in our sample than those shown in Altman (1968). The 
negligible coefficient on liquidity (WCTA) is consistent with the high correlation (Table A3-2) 
between liquidity (WCTA) and profitability (RETA & EBITTA). Sales (SALETA) has an 
opposite sign with a similar magnitude, which indicates that for our sample profit is more pivotal 
in determining bankruptcy than sales.26 Our results suggest that to lower bankruptcy risks, it is 
important to improve liquidity, enhance profitability and reduce leverage. 
To assess the classification accuracy of the MDA model, we perform in-sample and out-
of-sample predictions for recent bankruptcy events to further assess our models. For each type of 
prediction, we compute the Z-scores for Altman’s original and re-estimated model. For the in-
sample predictions, we report the cutoff point for the re-estimated Altman models for minimizing 
the misclassification and combined errors, respectively. Then, we analyze the Z-score predictions 
for the groups of bankrupt and non-bankruptcy firms. 
A3.2 In-Sample Predictions: MDA Model 
 
For our model, the cutoff Z-score is cutoffD̂  
= -0.119. The minimum Z-score of all non-
bankrupt firms is 0.091 and the maximum Z-score for all bankrupt firms is -0.328, so there is no 
‘gray area’ for the cutoff point. For the re-estimated model with cutoff cutoffD̂  
= -0.119, Type I 
(predicting a healthy firm to be bankrupt) and Type II (predicting a bankrupt firm to be healthy) 
errors are 0% and 0% for the re-estimated model, respectively. Table A3-3 reports the 
misclassification errors for the original and re-estimated models are 21% and 0%, respectively.27  
 
Table A3-3: Classification Errors of Altman Model for the In-Sample Predictions 





Type I 7 0.00 0.00 
Type II 7 0.42 0.00 
Misclassification Error 14 0.21 0.00 
Authors’ calculations; Altman’s Z-Score is 2.675; Our Z-Score cutoff is -0.119. There are 2 out of these 9 
firms do not have Z-Scores, and they are: Equitable Bag Co. Inc. and American Tissue Inc. As a result, 
there are only 7 bankrupt firms. 
 
																																																													
26 This puzzling feature is also reported in Hillegeist et al. (2004) with a sample of manufacturing industries. 
27 Based the cutoff, Dcutoff, a misclassification error occurs when an observation is forecast as bankrupt (not 
bankrupt) when the firm is actually nonbankrupt (bankrupt).  
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Although multiple discriminant analysis aims to minimize in-sample misclassification errors, our 
re-estimated model has both fewer in sample Type I and Type II misclassification errors than 
Altman’s original model, an expected result since predictions based upon Altman’s model are 
out-of-sample predictions.  
Using the average Z-score of bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms, the results presented in 
Table A3-4 indicate that the Z-score is useful in predicting bankruptcy for the pulp and paper 
firms in our sample. First, we apply the coefficients reported in Altman (1968) to compute the Z-  
 
Table A3-4: In-Sample Z-Score for Bankrupt (B) and Non-Bankrupt (NB) Firms 
 
  
1st year Before 
Bankruptcy 
2nd year Before 
Bankruptcy 
3rd year Before 
Bankruptcy 
 Model B (7) NB (7) B (8) NB (8) B (7) NB (7) 
Original 0.41 2.43 0.49 2.92 1.96 2.71 
Re-Estimated -1.36 0.38 -0.30 0.78 0.21 1.15 
Authors’ calculations; the cutoff of the original model is 2.68; the cutoff of our model is -0.119.  
 
score for our sample. For the original model, the cutoff point is 2.68. The average Z-scores of the 
ten failed firms for one, two, and three year horizons before bankruptcy fall below the cutoff 
point. However, the average Z-scores for non-bankrupt firms fall in the range of bankruptcy one, 
two and three year before bankruptcy. On average, there are Type II errors in predicting healthy 
firms to file bankruptcy. 
On the other hand, our re-estimated model predicts bankruptcy two years before the 
occurrence. Moreover, the Z-score is decreasing as the bankruptcy nears, which suggests that the 
probability of bankruptcy is increasing. Encouragingly, on average, there is no Type II error in 
this model because the Z-scores of non-failed firms remain higher than the cutoff. 
 
A3.3 Out-of-Sample Predictions  
 
Another assessment of our model is out-of-sample predictions. We estimated our model 
on sample data for the 1990-2005 to predict two bankruptcies and 42 non-bankruptcies that 
occurred between 2007 and 2008. We compute the Z-scores for each of these firms in 2006 using 
the original and re-estimated models. We then use these scores to predict bankruptcy or non-
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bankruptcy for the two year period 2007-2008. Table A3-5 reports the Type I, Type II and total 
misclassification errors for the two models. 
 
Table A3-5: Prediction Errors for the Out-of-Sample Forecast in Year 2006 





Type I  
(bankrupt firm is predicted to be healthy) 
 2 0.00 0.00 
Type II 
 (healthy firm is predicted to be bankrupt) 42 0.31 0.07 
Misclassification Error 44 0.30 0.07 
Authors’ calculations; the cutoff of the original model Z-Score is 2.68; the cutoff of  
our Z-Score model is -0.119. 
 
Z scores for original and re-estimated Altman models reflect Type I errors at 0% and Type II 
errors at 31% and 7%, respectively, for the original and re-estimated models. The 
misclassification errors, which suppose all events are equally likely, are 30% for the original 
model and 7% for the re-estimated model. As in the case of logit model, based on the 
misclassifications, the re-estimated model of Altman (1968) provides a better performance for 
the out-of-sample forecast than the original model. The re-estimated model out-performs the 
original models in terms of the Type II and misclassification errors. 
 We conclude that financial information is useful for bankruptcy prediction, which is 
robust to the specification and statistical technique employed in the analysis. 
	
